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INTRODUCTION
The point which nust be clearly understood is that the stru~ggle is not
over, and negotiations themselves are a theatre of stnggle, subject to
advances and reverses as an) otherforin of struggle.
Activists fighting destructive "development" projects and policies
do not often give a warm welcome to reports backed by the
international development establishment. However, this was the
* Patrick McCully is Campaigns Director of the International Rivers
Network, 1847 Berkeley Way, Berkeley, CA 94703, USA. He is the author of
SILENT RIVERS: THE ECOLOGY AND POLITICS OF LARGE DAMS (Zed Books 1996;
updated and expanded version 2001). Email: patrick(aiim.org.
1. Nelson Mandela's Opening Address to the 48' National Conference of the
African National Congress (July 2, 1991) (transcript available at
http:/lwwv.anc.org.zalancdocsfhistory/mandela/).
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reaction of many dam critics to the World Commission on Dams'
("WCD") final report, Dams and Development: A New Framnework
fbr Decision Making.2 For example, the International Committee on
Dams, Rivers, and People ("ICDRP"), 3 a coalition of people's
movements and non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") from
thirteen countries established to coordinate civil society input into
the WCD process, reacted positively to the Report. In the press
release issued to mark the report's release on November 16, 2000,
the ICDRP stated that Dams and Development "vindicates much of
what dam critics have long argued. If the builders and funders of
dams follow the recommendations of the WCD, the era of
destructive dams should come to an end."4
From the perspective of the ICDRP, the WCD process, and its
final report, have been a remarkable success. The WCD supports
many of the positions of anti-dam activists on the high impact and
low performance of dams, and lays down a strict set of criteria for
energy and water planning that echoes many of the activists'
demands. While a report written by anti-dam activists would look
quite different from the WCD report - especially regarding its
optimism that the planning criteria set by the WCD could be met and
a dam still be built - the important point is that the views expressed
in the Report reflect a consensus of a diverse group of stakeholders,
including prodam interests. For example, the World Bank sponsored
2. See Press Release: International Committee on Dams, Rivers and People
(Nov. 16, 2000) [hereinafter Press Release) (available at http://irn.org/wcl/)
(explaining how dam critics challenged dam industry funders to halt support for
dams until the commission put their proposals into action).
3. See id. (listing the names of the ICDRP members: The Association for
International Water and Forest Studies (Norway); Berne Declaration (Switzerland);
Campaign to Reform the World Bank (Italy); Coalition of People Affected by
Large Dams and Aqueducts (Spain); Cordillera Peoples' Alliance (Philippines);
The Cornerhouse (England); Environmental Monitoring Group (South Africa);
Friends of the Earth (Slovakia); International Rivers Network (USA); Movement
of People Affected by Dams (Brazil); Save the Narmada Movement (India);
Sobrevivencia (Paraguay); Southeast Asia Rivers Network (Thailand); Swedish
Society for Nature Conservation; World Economy, Ecology & Development
(Germany)).
4. Id.
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the WCD and among the twelve commissioners were a CEO of one
of the world's biggest engineering companies and an honorary
president of the main trade group of the global big dam industry."
However, whether or not the report will positively impact actual
practices remains to be seen.
This article analyzes the initial conditions and process that enabled
an international blue-ribbon commission to produce a report that has
been welcomed by many staunch critics of large dams.
Understanding the WCD process is important, not just as a piece of
forensic political science, but also because the World Bank, among
others, touted the WCD as a precedent for dealing with other
controversial global policy issues. Understanding the WCD process
should help activists on other issues determine whether a "trisectoral
network" policy process composed of governments and international
agencies, private companies, and civil society works to further their
aims, and if so, under what conditions.
Before explaining the background to the WCD. I should first
explain that I am writing this as someone involved in the process
from the beginning. I coordinated efforts by dam critics to lobby for
an independent international review committee of dam building and
participated in decisions regarding the committee's composition and
mandate. I have also served as coordinator of the ICDRP since its
inception in May of 1998. Thus, this paper reflects a personal
perspective on how the participation of activists resulted in a
Commission with the ability to deliver favorable results.
I. THE PREHISTORY OF THE WCD
The origins of the WCD lie in the many anti-dama struggles waged
by dam-affected communities and NGOs around the world, in
particular those targeting World Bank-funded projects from the
1980s onwards.6 The most important of these was the campaign
against World Bank-funding of the Sardar Sarovar dam on India's
5. See id. (noting that the WCD is made up of tvel\.e Commissioners of
various backgrounds).
6. See PATRICK MCCL LLN. SILENCED RI\ LRS: Till Ec OLOtjY (JF POLITICS OF
LARGE DAMS (Zed Books 1996) (expanded and updated version in pnnt)
(describing the rise of global movement against dams).
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Narmada River.' In June 1994, as part of NGO activism to mark the
World Bank's 5 0"h Anniversary, International Rivers Network, and
the Save the Narmada Movement (Narmada Bachao Andolan -
"NBA"), coordinated the "Manibeli Declaration," which called for a
moratorium on World Bank funding for dams.' Three hundred
twenty-six groups and coalitions in forty-four countries demanded
that the World Bank establish an "independent comprehensive
review of all Bank-funded large dam projects to establish the actual
costs, including direct and indirect economic, environmental and
social costs, and the actually realized benefits of each project."'
Activists believed that large dams regularly failed to deliver their
promised benefits and caused massive social and environmental
damage. 10 They also believed that the lack of any comprehensive and
independent assessments of the world's 45,000 large dams hindered
wider public acceptance of dam opponents' positions and gave undue
legitimacy to the industry's claims of the need for more dams.
At the end of 1994, the World Bank's Operations Evaluation
Department ("OED") informed International Rivers Network that it
would review Bank-funded dams. OED, despite its self-professed
independence, is a division of the World Bank. OED is staffed by
employees who formerly worked in the divisions of the Bank whose
work they now evaluate, and, as the OED's dams study clearly
demonstrated, the OED can be influenced by other interests within
the Bank. Despite concerns regarding the independence of OED,
IRN and several other NGOs decided to cooperate in good faith and,
through 1995, supplied information and comments to the OED team.
A final draft of the OED review was circulated internally to the
Bank's Executive Directors and senior management in September
1996. OED failed to meet its commitment to circulate drafts to
NGOs for comment, and the full review was never publicly released.
A sanitized four-page Precis is the only publicly available version of
7. See www.narmada.org.
8. Manibeli Declaration, at www.irn.org/programs/finance/manibeli.shtml
(Sept. 1994) (explaining how and why the World Bank should halt funding of large
dams).
9. Id.
10. See Press Release, supra note 2.
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the sixty-seven page review, although the review, minus an
important "Background Notes" document, was circulated to the
invitees of the April 1997 World Bank/World Conservation Union
workshop in Gland, Switzerland." The review concluded that "the
finding that thirty-seven of the large dams in this review (seventy-
four percent) are acceptable or potentially acceptable, suggests that,
overall, most large dams were justified."' 2
According to internal sources in the World Bank, the OED's
review process caused considerable concern within the institution.
Long-time Bank staff, who had worked on the dam projects being
reviewed, were resentful of criticism of dams and kept a close eye on
the OED team working on the review. These staff members helped
ensure that the review started with largely pro-dam assumptions and
ended with largely pro-dam conclusions.
As the report was being finalized in mid-1996, OED began
negotiations with the World Conservation Union ("IUCN")" to
create a consultation process on the results of the review and a
planned second phase which would look at ongoing Bank-funded
dams.14 These negotiations led to a decision whereby the OED and
the IUCN agreed to host a workshop at IUCN's headquarters in
Gland in April 1997. Plans were made to invite approximately 30
participants to the Gland meeting (ten from NGOs, including IUCN,
and the rest from public-sector dam-building agencies, private-sector
dam companies, the World Bank, and academia).
James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank, frequently
expressed his intention to make the institution more open to working
11. See Precis No. 125, World Bank Lending for Large Dams: A Preliminary
Review of Impacts, at http://wblnOO 18.worldbank.org/oed'oeddoclib.nsf / (Sept. 1,
1996) (describing the World Bank's role in the development of dams). See tnfra
note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the WB/IUCN Gland workshop).
12. 'The World Bank's Experience With Large Dams: A Preliminary Review
of Impacts', World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, August 1996.
13. The IUCN describes itself as a "'global union," part inter-governmental
agency, part-NGO, part consultancy, comprised of more than 900 member
institutions - governmental and non-governmental - spread across 137 countries.
14. See World Bank/IUCN, Invitation to Gland Workshop, 17 December, 1996
(on file with author). The second phase would also look at "comparative e% idence"
from industrialized countries.
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with civil society after he took charge in 1995. A "partnership
agreement" between the Bank and IUCN was one result of
Wolfensohn's new approach, and the negotiations over the Gland
workshop took place within the institutional framework of this
agreement. IUCN's agreement with the World Bank was part of its
Global Policy and Partnerships Initiative, which aimed to increase its
influence with international organizations in global policy making on
conservation-related issues. 15
OED/World Bank seemed to believe that working with IUCN on a
"multi-stakeholder" workshop to discuss their review would make
the institution appear transparent and willing to listen to the opinions
of others, and also help deflect expected criticism of their report from
anti-dam activists. Conversations with Gland workshop organizers
indicate that the World Bank assumed that the "NGOs" invited to
Gland would be mostly those which the Bank believed were most
"reasonable," and with which the Bank had a pre-existing working
relationship, such as the big international conservation groups like
IUCN, the World Wildlife Fund, and Conservation International.
With these groups participating in a consultative process with the
Bank and industry, more progressive groups could be easily
marginalized and dismissed as "unreasonable" and "fundamentalist."
Much to the credit of the IUCN staff coordinating the workshop, the
IUCN successfully impressed upon the OED/World Bank that the
Gland workshop would lack credibility unless anti-dam groups were
invited.
IUCN then contacted IRN to suggest names of activists to invite to
the workshop. IRN consulted with its allies around the world, and six
groups, known to be highly critical of dams, and the World Bank,
accepted invitations. 6 The invitation sent out by the OED and IUCN
listed four objectives of the workshop:
"to review the OED study;"
"to develop a methodological framework for the Phase II study
15. See www.iucn.org/places/usa/inter.html.
16. The six groups were: the Berne Declaration (Switzerland), IRN, Movement
of People Affected by Dams (Brazil), Save the Narmada Movement, Sobrevivencia
(Paraguay), and Sungi Foundation (Pakistan).
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that will consider the critical issues that need to be addressed in
determining the future development of a large dam - including
evaluation of alternatives and social, resettlement, environmental,
economic, technical and other relevant policy criteria:"
"to propose a rigorous, professional and transparent process for
defining the scope, objectives, organization and financing of the
Phase II study including basic guidelines for involvement by
Governments, the private sector and NGOs as well as public
participation, information disclosure and subsequent dissemination
of results"; and
"to identify additional follow-up actions necessary for the
development of generally accepted standards for assessment,
planning, building, operating and financing of large dams which
would adequately reflect lessons learnt from past experience."'
In mid-March 1997, a major meeting of anti-dam groups took
place in Curitiba, Brazil: the First International Meeting of People
Affected by Dams. The Curitiba Declaration summarized the
conclusions and provided the dam critics going to Gland with the
legitimacy of a manifesto endorsed by numerous anti-dam activists
and dam-affected people from around the world. The Curitiba
Declaration calls for an "international independent commission...
to conduct a comprehensive review" of large dams.' " IRN, and a
number of colleagues," viewed the Gland workshop as a platform to
attack the credibility of the OED review and to insist that instead of
carrying out a second phase of the OED process, the Bank should
commission a genuinely independent review of its dams.
17. See supra note 15 (on file with author).
18. Declaration of Curitiba, available at wwv .im.org programs cuntiba.html
(March 14, 1997).
19. In particular, Alex Wilks from the Bretton Woods Proiect in London. Chns
Chamberlain from the Bank Information Center in Washington, D.C., Shnpad
Dharmadhikary from the NBA. Himanshu Thakker. then \\ ith Centre for Science
and Environment in New Delhi. Peter Bosshard from Berne Declaration, and
Francesco Martone from the World Bank Reform Campaign in Rome. One reason
why this set of individuals and groups was keen to push for an independent review
of World Bank-funded dams was that all had been involved in the Narmada
campaign, where the key lever in dislodging the Bank from the Sardar Sarovar
project was an extremely critical Bank-commissioned independent review.
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Immediately before the Gland workshop, IRN wrote to World
Bank President James Wolfensohn, asking him to reject the
conclusions of the OED review and calling for a "comprehensive,
unbiased and authoritative review of past World Bank lending for
large dams" to be done by "a commission of eminent persons
independent of the World Bank" which "must be able to command
respect and confidence from all parties involved in the large dams
debate." 0 The letter to Wolfensohn, which was endorsed by forty-
four NGOs and anti-dam movements, was accompanied by a detailed
critique of OED's review showing that its methodology and
conclusions were deeply flawed and systematically biased in favor of
dams.2'
II. WHY WE ALL AGREED IN GLAND
The dam critics who came to Gland were greatly surprised that the
workshop resulted not only in an agreement to establish an
independent dam review, but that the review would encompass dams,
and not just those funded by the World Bank. The OED and Bank
staff involved in the Gland workshop 22 evidently decided before the
workshop that they did not want an independent review of Bank-
funded dams as this risked being a major embarrassment for the
institution. They also knew they could not easily defend the OED's
review and that the criticisms of the OED review meant that any
second phase carried out by the OED would lack sufficient
credibility. The OED/Bank staff therefore concluded that their best
20. Letter from Patrick McCully, International Rivers Network, to James D.
Wolfensohn, President, The World Bank, (May 8, 1997) (available at
www.irn.org/programs/review/letter970508.html).
21. See Patrick McCully, A Critique of 'The World Bank's Experience with
Large Dams: A Preliminary Review of Impacts, " IRN, Apr. 1997 (available at
www.irn.org/programs/finance/oedcritique.shtml).
22. The World Bank was represented at the workshop by the Director (Andrew
Steer) and two staff (Robert Goodland and Kathryn McPhail) from the
Environment Department; the Senior Water Adviser (John Briscoe); the Director
of the Industry and Energy Dept (Richard Stern); Martyn Riddle, Manager of the
Environment Department of the Bank's private sector arm, the International
Finance Corporation; the Director General of the OED (Robert Picciotto), and the
OED Principal Evaluations Officer and lead author of their dams review, Andres
Liebenthal.
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response to the NGOs' demands would be to propose the
establishment of a review of dam building in general. This would
deflect the focus of any review away from the Bank's role in
building dams and onto the industry and technology in general, and
deflect anti-dam groups away from attacking the OED review.
More surprising than the Bank's offer of a global dam review was
that the dam industry representatives at the workshop agreed to the
proposal. There are several explanations for this. Most importantly,
by 1997 anti-dam campaigns were seriously hurting the dam
industry. Activists had brought most large dam building in the more
industrialized countries to a halt and were increasingly hampering
the activities of dam builders in the rest of the world. Criticism from
campaigners who, the dam industry believed, have an undue
influence upon the media and public opinion, hurt the self-respect of
individuals in the dam industry. Many in the industry had spent their
careers building huge dams, confident in their belief that these
projects were essential to lifting poor and underdeveloped countries
and people into a well-fed and watered, energy- and money-rich
modem world. Many accepted, to some extent, that problems had
been caused and mistakes made, but they were confident that the
benefits to society in general far outweighed any harm to small
numbers of displaced people or a few fish species.
Another important factor in contributing to the agreement by dam
proponents for an independent dam review was that they were
finding it extremely difficult to finance dam projects. Big dams had
always been built with government and development agency money,
but in recent years shrinking government budgets, coupled with
pressure from anti-dam campaigns, were drying up this previously
plentiful source. In the early 1990s, as governments started to sell
state-owned infrastructure and seek private investors to build new
power plants, roads and pipelines, many dam promoters saw a new
opportunity. The industry would have to learn new project financing
skills as private funds would soon be available.
As the 1990s progressed, however, the dam industry found that
private investors did not necessarily care that dams stopped rivers
"running to waste to the sea," as dam promoters liked to claim, or
that that they supposedly allowed countries to become self-sufficient
in the production of food, controlled floods, and created beautiful
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reservoirs. Investors, caring only about their earnings, were finding
out that dams were not an effective way to make money. Despite the
oft-repeated claim that hydropower is a cheap energy source, big
dams are exceedingly expensive, and slow and difficult to build.
Private investors were discovering that big dams had an appalling
record of time and cost overruns, and that hydrologists had
systematically underestimated the impacts of droughts on
hydropower production.
Given that financing by private investors was lacking, dam
supporters hoped that an independent review would help overcome
their economic problems by providing a justification for new public
subsidies - especially for hydropower dams. Part of this justificiation
would be that because hydro projects supposedly provide ancilliary
benefit, such as flood control, water supply, and reservoir recreation,
private hydro project operators should receive public monies for
these public goods. 23 The most important argument for hydropower
subsidies, the industry believed, was that hydropower was a
"climate-friendly" technology, and, therefore, hydropower dams
should be eligible for some of the projected billions of dollars to be
generated under global carbon trading mechanisms established under
international measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
Distressingly for the industry, mounting evidence-accepted by the
WCD-shows that reservoirs can emit significant amounts of
methane and carbon dioxide from rotting vegetation and soils. Dams,
therefore, cannot be assumed to be "climate friendly."
For some in the industry, particularly the older engineers with a
lifetime of experience in the business, a review would vindicate their
belief that large dams are essential for society and have largely
achieved their promised benefits. They believed that dam builders
would emerge with honor, while dam critics would be forced to
acknowledge the error of their ways. For others, a consensus
regarding international standards for dam building would provide
clarity on which dams would be likely to provoke opposition,
consequently risking expensive delays and legal actions, and those
23. Large dams without a significant hydropower component are rarely funded
by the private sector largely due to the difficulty that project operators have in
collecting revenues from non-hydro reservoir functions.
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which would be safe investments. This clarity was especially
important for those in companies that were switching from the role
of contractors and suppliers of equipment in a public sector context,
to equity-holding developers in the new privatized world.
While there were strategic explanations for the industry to support
an independent review, there were also extremely good reasons from
a dam-builder's perspective to oppose it. Some in the industry side
were always deeply suspicious of, and even openly hostile to, the
Commission. Probably the two most fundamentalist dam proponents
who did attend the workshop were Theo P.C. Van Robbroeck from
South Africa, President of the International Commission on Large
Dams ("ICOLD"), and Aly Shady. from Egypt, President of the
International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage ("ICID"). -
Neither Van Robbroeck nor Shady was able to exert much influence
at Gland, in part because they failed to develop and gain support for
a common strategy.
III. RESULTS OF THE GLAND MEETING
The Gland meeting concluded with agreement on a joint press
release by the World Bank and IUCN. The press release stated that
"[d]am-builders and some of their strongest critics agreed today to
work together to review the development effectiveness of large dams
and to establish internationally accepted standards that would
improve the assessment, planning, building, operating and financing
of these projects. 2 The review, to be carried out by a "high level
international group," was to start its work in November 1997 at the
end of a six-month establishment phase. The review would then have
two years to issue its final report.
The outline terms of reference agreed for the Commission were:
To assess experience with existing. new and proposed large dam prolects
so as to improve (existing) practices and social and environmental
24. ICOLD is the main trade association for the international dam industry and
ICID is its parallel among irrigation engineers. ICOLD %%as deeply split on
whether to support or oppose the WCD almost from the beginning of the process.
ICID was largely hostile to its existence.
25. www.iucn.org/info-andnews/pressreleases dams-agreement.html.
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conditions;
To develop decision-making criteria and policy and regulatory
frameworks for assessing alternatives for energy and water resources
development;
To evaluate the development effectiveness of large dams;
To develop and promote internationally acceptable standards for the
planning, assessment, design, construction, operation and monitoring of
large dam projects, and if the dams are built, ensure affected peoples are
better off;
To identify the implications for institutional, policy and financial
arrangements so that benefits, cost and risks are equitably shared at the
global, national and local levels; and
To recommend interim modifications - where necessary - of existing
policies and guidelines, and promote "best practices."
26
The participants at the Gland workshop would form a "Reference
Group" to oversee the establishment of the review, which would
include, most importantly, reaching agreement on a mandate and a
list of Commissioners. IUCN and World Bank would form an
Interim Working Group ("IWG") to administer the establishment
process in close consultation with the Reference Group.
The agreement at Gland laid the foundation for the process that
would ultimately lead to the WCD's final report. The agreement
defined the general aims of the Commission and made the principles
of transparency, consultation, and independence key to the process.
This agreement set a generally progressive agenda that highlighted
the need to: make dam-affected people better off, explore the issue of
equity in the distribution of the costs and benefits from dams, and
improve social and environmental conditions at existing dams. The
inclusion of these issues was an implicit recognition that existing
dams had left people worse off, had not been equitable, and had left a
legacy of unresolved social and environmental damage. The
26. IUCN and World Bank Group, Large Dams: Learning from the Past,
Looking at the Future, Workshop Proceedings, 9 (Tony Dorcy ed., July 1997)
available at www. dams.org/docs/largedams.html.
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Commission would therefore have to address these problems, and
any recommendations by the Commission would likely increase the
requirements to be met before dams could be built.
Most importantly, the Gland workshop established the identity and
roles of many dranatis personae. It also established dam critics as
central to the legitimacy of the review. This allowed dam critics to
wield an unusual amount of power, for without their involvement,
the process would lose much of its credibility. As the process
unfolded, IJCN and the World Bank continued to boast proudly of
how they had brought together the two sides of a highly contentious
debate and forged consensus betveen them. Although it was
uncomfortable for dam critics to be helping the World Bank's public
relations, this rhetoric was important in maintaining the bargaining
power of the critics.
It was vital to the success of the WCD that civil society
representatives in the process included strong anti-dam critics. Had
this sector of the "multistakeholder process" been represented by the
more establishment-minded conservation and development groups
(groups that possess few, if any, links to dam-affected communities
and the international anti-dam movement), there would have been
little possibility of producing a progressive report.
While the Gland workshop gave the World Bank and IUCN power
during the establishment phase of the Commission, the Commission
would be independent from both organizations once established. Just
as the lack of an organized bloc of strong pro-dam individuals
allowed consensus to be reached at Gland, the absence of these same
pro-dam individuals from the Reference Group allowed progress to
be made on the establishment of a Commission. The exclusion of
governments from substantive power in the process was also vital.
Had the governments of leading dam building nations like Brazil,
China, India, Japan or Turkey formed an organized bloc within the
Reference group, it is almost certain that their coalition would have
destroyed the Commission's potential to issue a progressive report.' 7
27. China was, in fact, closely involved in the Commission until the end of
1998. A representative from China's Ministry of Water Resources attended the
Gland meeting and the Chinese selected another individual from the ministry, Shen
Guoyi, to be a Commissioner. Although Shen was, by all accounts, keen to play a
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Dam critics had long believed that post-construction reviews of
the performance and impact of dams, if carried out in an honest and
rigorous manner, would confirm many of their arguments. The
design of the WCD these conditions to be met.
Although the Gland meeting laid the foundations for a successful
Commission from a dam critics' perspective, it is difficult to
overstate the amount of hard work and political maneuvering that lay
ahead. It is also hard to overstate the importance of a number of
individuals within the Commission and Secretariat in moving the
Commission in a progressive direction, while keeping a sufficient
part of the dam industry supportive of the process. NGOs who
followed the process also had an essential role in terms of making
submissions, commenting on drafts of studies, and helping
coordinate input from dam-affected people.
Not surprisingly, the transition period between the Gland meeting
and the launch of the Commission was filled with contention.
Granting the World Bank and IUCN a rather vague mandate to
administer the process through the IWG was clearly a mistake. The
IWG attempted to make decisions that the six NGOs and movements
of the Reference Group saw as a breach of the Gland agreement.
Trust was partly restored by forming a larger IWG for key meetings
that included representatives of the various interest groups within the
Reference Group. The first major decision by this "expanded" IWG
was the selection of South African Water Minister, Kader Asmal, to
chair the Commission. From the perspective of the anti-dam
campaigners, Asmal's past as a leading anti-apartheid activist and
professor of international human rights law gave him impressive
progressive credentials. However, he had recently approved the
construction of a huge dam in Lesotho to supply South Africa with
water and had belligerently criticized NGOs that claimed the dam
was unnecessary. This aspect of Asmal's record was obviously seen
as positive by the pro-dam elements on the Reference Group.
The most contentious issue raised during the establishment process
constructive role on the Commission, her Ministry forced her to resign. The
presumption is that the Chinese realized that the Commission was unlikely to
further their interests and Shen's participation in the Commission would backfire
on them.
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was the selection of the Commissioners to serve under Asmal. The
IWG and Asmal had to cancel the Commission launch, scheduled for
November 24, because their proposed list of commissioners was not
accepted by dam critics in particular because of the weak
representation of commissioners representing dam-affected people's
movements. At several points over the following months it appeared
that the process had collapsed. At the beginning of January 1998,
however, Asmal agreed to a proposal from dam critics that the
expanded IWG hold a last-ditch meeting in Cape Town at the end of
the month. The participants at the meeting managed to agree on a
final slate of Commissioners, which was subsequently accepted by
the rest of the Reference Group." The main changes agreed at the
meeting were the addition of Medha Patkar, the leading activist in
the Narmada Bachao Andolan, and the confirmation of Indian
economist L.C. Jain as Vice-Chair. The official launch of the WCD
finally took place on February 16, 1998.
IV. WCD AS A MODEL OF GLOBAL POLICY
MAKING?
Analyzing the WCD process is set to become something of a
cottage industry in coming years. There are several academic
analyses and a book on the process underway, as well as a major
multi-year assessment by the Washington, D.C.-based World
Resources Institute and three partner Southern NGOs. The WCD
process has attracted such interest chiefly because of the unique way
it brought togethe" the different sides of the debate and the belief that
the WCD process could be used as a model for resolving other
28. The agreed list of commissioners was Donald Blackmore (Chief Executive,
Murray-Darling Basin Commission, Australia). Joji Carifio (Executive Secretary,
International Alliance of Indigenous-Tribal Peoples of the Tropical Forest,
Philippines), Jose Goldemberg (energy expert, University of Sao Paulo). Judy
Henderson (Chair, Oxfam International, Australia), Wolfgang Pircher (former
president of the International Commission on Large Dams. later replaced by
another former president, Jan Veltrop). L.C. Jain (Indian High Commissioner to
South Africa), G6ran Lindahl (CEO. Asea Brown Boveri. Sweden), Deborah
Moore (Senior Scientist, Environmental Defense Fund. USA). Thayer Scudder
(Prof. of Anthropology, California Institute of Technology). Shen Guoyi (Director-
General of Department of International Cooperation, Chinese Ministry of Water
Resources).
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contentious development issues. World Bank President James
Wolfensohn, for example, suggested to NGOs at a meeting during
the Bank's annual meeting in Prague in September 2000, that they
could form a similar commission to assess the activities of the oil,
mining and gas industries. 9
Further, Jan Martin Witte, Thorsten Benner, and Wolfgang H.
Reinicke, call the WCD a "prototypical example" of how "trisectoral
networks can help overcome stalemate in highly conlfict-ridden
policy arenas. ' 3° Reinicke is co-director of the Global Public Policy
Project,31 which the UN Foundation sponsors to explore the potential
of public policy networks for increasing the effectiveness of the
United Nations. The Global Public Policy Project has held a
workshop and written a book and several papers that use the WCD as
29. See Transcript of the World Bank Group NGO Meeting with Mr.
Wolfensohn, available at www.worldbank.org/htm/extdr/amOO/ts092200a.htm
(visited June 16, 2001) (stating "What I am prepared to do is to do with you in a
way that I think we should explore what I have done on dams. On dams, we have
had an international and balanced Commission on Dams to take a look-and they
will be reporting in a few months' time-on whether we've got it wrong or
whether we've got it right on dams, and what it is we should do and what it is we
shouldn't do. I would be perfectly happy to sit down with you and with your
colleagues to try to see if there is some mechanism that we can stand back and take
a look at the actualities of this extractive industry ... You can even get Jeffrey
Sachs to come and give his views on the subject if you'd like, so that is the major
concession I'll give you in relation to it, and that's because I've been drinking.").
Note that this statement was given before Wolfensohn knew what the WCD report
actually said. Since the report was issued, the World Bank has appeared much less
enthusiastic about the WCD.
30. See JAN MARTIN WITTE ET AL., Beyond Multilateralism: Global Public
Policy Networks' Politik und Gesellschaft Online, available at
http://www.fes.de/IPG/ipg2_2000/artwitte.html (visited June 16, 2001) [hereinafter
WITTE] (explaining that during the process of dam construction, the trisectoral
networks often solve the gridlock that occurs among development planners,
contracting firms, and environmental groups).
31. See About the Global Public Policy Project, available at
http://www.globalpublicpolicy.net/AboutGPP.htm (visited June 16, 2001) (stating
that this network based approach facilitates communication among the public
sector, private sector, and civil society and this increased communication furthers
the progress of United Nations-sponsored projects). The Global Public Policy
Project is sponsored by the UN Foundation to explore the potential of public policy
networks for increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations. Aside from co-
directing the Global Public Policy Project, Reineke is a Senior Partner and Senior
Economist in the Corporate Strategy Group of the World Bank.
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a positive example of a "trisectoral network"-the three sectors
being the public sector, private sector, and civil society. 32
Witte et al. consider the WCD a "success" on the basis that the
process was able to bring parties with such different interests
together and move forward with them on board. For Witte et al., the
WCD exists "to overcome stalemate" between dam proponents and
opponents in a "highly conflict-ridden" policy arena, so as to
"facilitate sustainable dam construction."" Just keeping people
talking was therefore an achievement in itself
The WCD itself characterized is raison d'etre in similar terms of
the need to break a supposed "stalemate." In its final report the WCD
explained the factors leading to its formation in the following terms:
By the early 1990s, it was becoming clear that the cost of controversy
could seriously affect future prospects for dams and stall efforts to finance
other non-dam water and energy development projects... The stalemate
did not benefit governments, dam builders, communities or the
environment, as no actions or investments were considered attractive
given the ongoing conflict. A new way had to be found. 4
To activists involved in the process, the purpose of the WCD was
not to break a supposed stalemate or facilitate "sustainable" dam
construction. Had anti-dam groups perceived a stalemate that was
blocking dam construction, it is likely that they would have been
happy to strengthen it, not attempt to overcome it. In reality, while
anti-dam groups were certainly gaining strength and making it
increasingly difficult to build dams, there were still plans for
hundreds of dams, not including those already under construction.
32. See Summary of the Workshop on Global Public Policy Networks,
available at http:// wwwv.globalpublicpolicy.net/AboutGPP.htm (visited June 16,
2001) (explaining that the goal of the workshop is to upgrade initiatives, build
netwvorks, and advise international organizations on how they can better serve the
global dimension of development). Other "trisectoral networks" cited by Reinicke
andothers, include the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research,
the Roll Back Initiative, and the International Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers. See id.
33. See WITTE, supra note 30.
34. See WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS. DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: THE
REPORT OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, at 26 (Earthscan 2000).
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Due to this reality, anti-dam activists saw the WCD as a means to
further the aims of the international movement against dams by
getting a thorough and unbiased review of the actual impacts and
performance of dams that would be difficult for dam promoters to
ignore or discredit. Dam critics realized that it was extremely
unlikely that a multi-stakeholder commission would take a firm "no
dams" stance. But they correctly believed that such a commission
could set strict criteria for future dams, that, if followed, would
prevent most destructive dams from going forward, promote better
alternatives, and help promote recognition of the need for reparations
for past damage due to dam construction. To adapt Clausewitz's
famous dictum, the WCD was a mere of the anti-dam struggle by
other means.
For pro-dam supporters, the WCD offered an opportunity to
establish for dam construction which dam critics would accept. This
would reduce the risks of project delays and cancellations due to
public opposition. Dam backers also hoped the report would prove
that dams were vital to society, giving the industry a much-needed
economic boost by legitimizing its demands for subsidies. The World
Bank's main interest in agreeing to the WCD was to salvage the
credibility it lost after the harsh criticism of the OED report and its
long history of support for dams in general. Thus, suggestions that
the WCD came into being because the parties involved agreed on the
need to break a "stalemate" is a misleading post facto rationalization
for the process and depoliticizes the motivations of the various
players involved.
V. WORLD BANK AND INDUSTRY
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WCD'S SUCCESS
The World Bank's involvement in the formation of the WCD was
key to its success because of its logistical, administrative, and
financial capacity and, most importantly, because of the impression
of non-threatening Establishmentarianism which the World Bank's
inclusion lent to the process. This helped convince other pro-dam
elements that it was safe for them to be involved. However, it is
important to note that the World Bank was not an honest broker of
the WCD process. The role of the World Bank in the IWG was far
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from neutral. Indeed, while the Bank's early involvement was crucial
to getting the WCD off the ground, its withdrawal from direct
influence (and the largely successful efforts of Commissioners and
staff to keep the Bank's influence at a minimum) once the
Commission succeeded the IWG was also critical to the WCD's
success.
A second vital element in the WCD's success is the dam
industry's lack of experience in common strategizing and action, and
its inability to reach a common position on whether and how to
engage the WCD. Had the industry possessed better organizational
skills it may have either refused to take part in the WCD or done
more to influence the process. Several pro-dam governments and
agencies attacked the process at one time or another, but their efforts
were never coordinated or effective. The Chinese and Indian
governments both withdrew from the process after initially
welcoming it, and, in doing so, only ensured that they could do little
to influence its outcome.
On the public sector side, there are agencies such as Pakistan's
Water and Power Development Authority ("WAPDA") and Turkey's
State Hydraulic Works ("DSI"), that are extremely powerful within
their own countries, but have little, if any, experience with lobbying
or political strategizing at the international level. Possibly the most
sophisticated and powerful pro-dam public utility is Hydro-Quebec.
While Hydro-Quebec recently set up an international subsidiary,
strong opposition to its dam plans within Quebec. especially within
First Nation communities, has forced it to adopt relatively
progressive guidelines on issues such as gaining the consent of
affected communities. This practice sets it apart from industry
practice in the rest of the world. Most other public sector dam
agencies in northern countries have been forced to shift from the
building of dams, to management and repair. as dam-building has
come to a close in these countries. These dam agencies now have
little interest in promoting new dams around the world.
Another contributing factor to the WCD's success is that the
international dam industry, unlike the oil, nuclear, automobile, and
tobacco industries, has little experience with modem public relations
or lobbying techniques. Part of the explanation for this inexperience
lies in the fragmented nature of the industry. There are few "dam
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companies" in the way there are oil or tobacco companies. Some
engineering consultancies, such as Acres International and Marza
Engineering, which are highly dependent on contracts in the "water
resources sector" could be described as "dam companies," but these
firms tend to possess relatively little financial and political clout.
Hydropower contracts make up a very small part of the overall
business of generation equipment suppliers like ABB, Siemens,
Mitsubishi or Toshiba. Similarly, dams tend to be only a small part
of the overall portfolio of international construction companies such
as Balfour Beatty and Impregilo.
The international dam industry, moreover, has little experience in
modem public relations or lobbying techniques. This is partly
because big dams are, in essence, a 1950s and 1960s technology, and
one with an increasingly controversial image. Few dynamic young
engineers seem to be attracted to the dam industry. Active industry
advocates are mostly elderly male engineers used to working in
government bureaucracies or private firms where they relied on a
steady stream of public sector contracts with little or no
accountability regarding the performance of their projects. The
public relations of the international dam industry consists mainly of
engineers writing in trade magazines espousing the great global
benefits of dams and presenting of the articles at conferences
attended by those who read the trade magazines. Domestically, in
countries such as India, pro-dam public relations can be relatively
plentiful, although it is generally unsophisticated.
An additional factor in the outcome of the WCD was the character
of the two Commissioners most closely identified with the industry:
Jan Veltrop (former president of the International Commission on
Large Dams) and Gbran Lindahl (CEO of the engineering
multinational ABB). Both Veltrop and Lindahl proved to be
generally open-minded and prepared to accept the evidence that
dams have underperformed and have had huge social and
environmental impacts. They further accepted the progressive policy
principles that formed the basis for the WCD's recommendations.
Witte, Reinicke and Benner state that:
Managing a network requires skillful social entrepreneurship, flexibility
and imagination and the ability to learn on the go ... [t]he first task, of
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course, is getting the network up and running. Often it is the vision,
dynamism and resolve of one or a few individuals-like Kadar (sic)
Asmal in the case of the World Commission on Dams-that provide the
spark for a new network.35
The WCD experience has certainly shown that the vision,
imagination, skill, and dynamism of individuals is vital to the
success of political processes. Asmal, according to insider accounts,
could be overly domineering within Commission meetings, yet he
did prove to be a dynamic chair who skillfully maneuvered the
process forward. The diplomatic skills of the Secretary General,
Achim Steiner, were also vital in keeping most of the people
involved in the process sufficiently satisfied most of the time. Steiner
also played a vital role in fundraising. The Commission's ten million
dollar budget was funded by fifty-three different donors, mainly
governments, companies, and foundations.
VI. LIMITATIONS OF THE WCD
An important limitation of the WCD that global policy process
analysts have not yet recognized, but that would be relevant to any
other similar process, is its 6litism. Despite claims of inclusiveness,
only those individuals proficient in English and able to access large
amounts of electronic documentation were able to have substantive
input. Only a handful of WCD documents were available in non-
English languages, and most of these documents were merely general
background brochures. With the huge volume of background
documentation produced by the WCD, and the numerous drafts of
each document, it would have been a massive task to translate
everything into other languages. Still, more documentation could
have been translated had resources been made available.
Witte, Reinicke, and Benner state that the two year time limit
imposed on the WCD was an "important precondition for the
success" of the process and that "setting a time limit on the
commission's activities ensures that the results will be useful to
various stakeholders because of their timeliness, and guarantees that
the WCD will not degenerate into just another talking shop unable to
35. See WITTE, supra note 30.
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admit to its growing irrelevance."36 While Witte, Rienicke, and
Benner believe that limited time actually contributed to the success
of the WCD, the shortage of time also created many problems. For
example, the Commission found it difficult to find consultants
available at short notice to prepare background studies, and
extremely tight deadlines made it difficult to comment on study
drafts. Time constraints also hindered the amount of documents that
could be translated. A significant overall limitation for the WCD was
the difficulty (and sometimes lack of staff will) in finding consultants
to conduct studies from outside the mainstream dam consulting
industry. This problem was exacerbated because non-mainstream
consultants who wanted to do a thorough job were dissuaded by the
short time available. Commission staff gave time shortage as a
reason for their lack of effort to inform the studies with input from
grassroots organizations and others without the capacity to access,
rapidly read, and comment upon voluminous documents in English.
Another important political dynamic within the WCD was the
constant conflict over producing what one ICDRP member called
"ruthlessly truthful" conclusions that fully reflected the actual
evidence gathered, which was strongly advocated by the WCD, and
the concern that the industry should not be able to easily dismiss the
WCD's final Report as overly radical and its recommendations as
unrealistic.
The WCD can be described as a globalized and privatized policy
process. The public sector was, to a significant extent, marginalized
from the process, and much of its accustomed political space taken
up by civil society and the private sector. It was in this case fortunate
that civil society was better able to exploit this space than in the dam
industry. This was sue both to the fragmented and politically
unsophisticated nature of the dam industry, and to effective
networking and close political and personal relationships among
many individuals and groups in the international anti-dam
movement.
While this marginalization of the political sector may seem
uncomfortable to those concerned by the ongoing worldwide
36. See WITTE, supra note 30.
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privatization of former state functions, marginalizing states from the
WCD's negotiations does nothing to reduce the importance of states
and international organizations as the main bodies charged with the
responsibility of implementing the report's (non-binding)
recommendations. As Witte and his colleagues explain, global public
policy networks are meant to complement states, not replace them. I"
37. See WiT'E, supra note 30.
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